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DOTHARD V. RAWLINSON: A METHOD OF
ANALYSIS FOR FUTURE BFOQ CASES
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act' prohibits sex-based dis-
rimination in employment' except "in those certain instances where
...sex. . . is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation"3 of the employer's busi-
ness. Once a Title VII plaintiff demonstrates discrimination on the
basis of sex, the defendant may assert the BFOQ as an affirmative
defense. Courts usually approach the BFOQ through a two-step
analysis, first considering which qualifications are reasonably neces-
sary for the job and then deciding whether the evidence proves that
members of one sex do not possess such qualifications.4 Throughout
the "early" sex discrimination cases, federal courts failed to produce
a uniform standard for application of the BFOQ defense.5 In
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1976), as amended
by Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555.
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to. . . .discriminate against any individual. . . .because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
...., because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e) (1976). The BFOQ
exception also specifies religion and national origin, but not race or color. Id
4. Eg., Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 38-40 (5th Cir. 1974) (court considered weight
lifting required for position of warehouseman, and testimony of employees of ware-
house concerning whether a woman could do the work); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive
Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715, 717-78 (7th Cir. 1969) (court apparently accepted contention
that some jobs at defendant's plant required lifting thirty-five pound objects, and then
considered evidence that state law limits on weights women may lift at work varied
considerably, and that the International Labor Organization had rejected any numeri-
cal limit); Cheatwood v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754, 758-59
(M.D. Ala. 1969) (court found job required lifting of heavy coin boxes, and then
discussed medical testimony on weight lifting abilities of women).
5. See notes 20-32 and accompanying text infra.
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Dolhard v. Rawlinson,6 the United States Supreme Court applied a
standard composed of elements from several of these earlier cases, in
holding that being male is a BFOQ for employment as a guard in a
maximum security prison for men.7
The defendant in Rawlinson, the Alabama Board of Corrections,
restricted employment as guard in Alabama's maximum security
male prisons to men by regulation.8 Plaintiff, a female applicant for
the position, brought a class action in federal court,9 asserting that
this rule violated Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment.' The
district court granted judgment for the plaintiff" but the Supreme
Court reversed.' 2 Operating on the premise that the essence of a
6. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
7. Id at 334-37.
8. Id at 323-25. Although Alabama allows women to serve in contact positions at
its male minimum security prisons, the challenged regulation precludes men from
serving as guards at the state's female maximum security institution. Since more jobs
are available at the male maximum security penitentiaries than at the female counter-
part, the regulation eliminates proportionately more jobs for women than men. id at
327-28, 332-33 n.16.
9. Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169 (M.D. Ala. 1976),aqJ'dinpar. rev din part
sub noam Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). Plaintiff also challenged statu-
tory minimum height (five foot two inches) and weight (120 pounds) requirements for
guards. She asserted these minima disproportionately exclude women and therefore
violated Title VII and the Equal Protection clause. At the same time, another plain-
tiff, Brenda Mieth, challenged Alabama's height and weight requirements for state
troopers. She based her action solely on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed 1976), which authorized three judge
courts to hear claims of unconstitutionality of state statutes and administrative regula-
tions, three district court judges decided the two cases. 418 F. Supp. at 1172. Al-
though a single judge could have considered Rawlinson's Title VII claims, the issues
of the two cases were sufficiently similar that it was not inappropriate for three judges
to hear both cases. 433 U.S. at 324 n.5.
The district court struck down the height and weight requirements for state troop-
ers. 418 F. Supp. at 1182. The state did not appeal this portion of the decision. 433
U.S. at 324 n.4.
The district court also gave judgment for Plaintiff Rawlinson on both the height
and weight issue and the issue of whether women could serve as guards in the all male
maximum security prisons. The state appealed both holdings. 433 U.S. at 328.
10. Plaintiff did not assert that the Equal Protection Clause requires more rigor-
ous scrutiny of a state's sexually discriminatory employment practices than does Title
VII. Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not give independent consideration to the
district court's ruling that the administrative regulation violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. 433 U.S. at 334 n.20.
11. 418 F. Supp. at 1185.
12. 433 U.S. at 337. There was no intermediate appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1253
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guard's job is to maintain security, the Court found that the violence
and disorder which characterized the Alabama prison could not be
controlled by female guards. Since women 13 were inherently unable
to satisfy the conditions of their employment, the Alabama Board of
Corrections could successfully invoke the BFOQ defense.
Both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and lower
federal courts have consistently interpreted the BFOQ as a narrow
exception to the rule against discrimination based on sex. 4 This in-
(1976) any party to an action may directly appeal to the Supreme Court from an order
of a properly convened three judge district court. See note 9 and accompanying test
supra.
13. 433 U.S. at 334-37. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding
that the height and weight requirements violate Title VII. Id at 331. Hence plaintiff
Rawlinson is eligible for a contact position at Alabama's minimum security prisons,
or the female maximum security prison.
Three justices agreed that the district court would have been justified in reaching a
different result on the height and weight issue if the defendant had argued that the
reason for the requirement was an appearance of strength. Id at 340 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). The only job-related justification the defendant offered was that of phys-
ical strength. 433 U.S. at 331; 418 F. Supp. at 1182. The majority opinion noted that
defendant could administer some sort of test to determine whether the applicant was
strong enough to serve as a guard. 433 U.S. at 332.
A fourth justice objected to plaintiffs use of national height and weight statistics to
establish her claim of disproportionate exclusion of women. He thought it was un-
likely that these statistics corresponded to the heights and weights of females who
would consider a career in corrections. Bigger women would be more likely to want
to be guards than smaller women. 433 U.S. at 348-49 (White, J., dissenting).
Two justices dissented from the Court's holding that being male is a BFOQ for the
position of guard in the all-male penitentiaries. They emphasized that there was no
evidence in the record that the presence of female guards would create any greater
danger in the Alabama prisons than already existed. Id at 342 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
14. Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 39 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Effective implementation of
the anti-discrimination legislation compels a narrow interpretation of the [BFOQ] ex-
ception . . ."); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1971)
("We conclude. . . that the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission is correct
in determining that BFOQ establishes a narrow exception. ... ); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(a) (1977). See also White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1051, 1102-
03 (1967).
The EEOC regulations recognize only one circumstance as justifying a BFOQ find-
ing: -iw]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, e.g., actor
or actress." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1977). The regulations specify that the EEOC
will not find the following situations to warrant application of the BFOQ: assump-
tions of employment characteristics of women (e.g., a higher turnover rate); stereo-
typed characterizations of the sexes (e.g., that women are not capable of aggressive
salesmanship); or preference of customers or fellow workers. Id § 1604.2(a)(1).
Courts faced with the BFOQ defense usually give the EEOC regulations considera-
tion. E.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1971);
1979)
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terpretation conforms to the scheme of non-discrimination under Ti-
tle VII: employers should consider individuals for a job solely on the
basis of individual capacity rather than on characteristics associated
with one sex.' 5
Federal courts have imposed a strict burden on proof of Title VII
defendants and have identified a number of circumstances that do
not justify the BFOQ defense. For example, stereotyped characteri-
zations of men and women never suffice.' 6 A demonstration of rigors
or hazards of a job, 7 even if a majority of women would not seek
such employment,' 8 will not warrant application of the BFOQ. Fur-
ther, if certain job requirements conflict with state laws regulating
employment of women, the job does not automatically fall into the
BFOQ category. Title VII supersedes such statutes when they serve
as classifications that restrict women to lower-paying jobs. 9
Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 716-17 (7th Cir. 1969). In Rawlinson,
the Supreme Court mentioned that the EEOC regulations should be given weight, 433
U.S. 334 n.19, but did not acknowledge that it had not followed them.
15. E.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971);
Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 1969); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2
(a)(1)(ii) (1977).
16. E.g, Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (Rejecting
defendant's BFOQ defense, the court stated: "What does seem clear is that using
these class stereotypes denies desirable positions to a great many women perfectly
capable of performing the duties involved."); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369
F. Supp. 522, 537 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (The court rejected defendant's claim that females
did not want advancement as follows: "[Tihis appears to be a type of warrantless
assumption based on the generalizations or stereotyped characterizations of the sexes
17. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cir. 1969)
("Labeling a job 'strenuous' does not meet the burden of proving that the job is within
the bona fide occupational qualification exception"); Cheatwood v. Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754, 758-59 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (court rejected BFOQ defense,
even though there was evidence that some of the physical requirements of the job
were such that many women could not manage it).
18. Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522, 537 (W.D. Pa. 1973)
(court disregarded testimony of certain female employees of defendant that they
would not want the jobs in question). Accord, Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969):
Title VII. . . . vests individual women with the power to decide whether to take
on unromantic tasks. Men have always had the right to determine whether the
incremental increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, bor-
ing or unromantic tasks is worth the candle. The promise of Title VII is that
women are now to be on equal footing.
19. Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974)
(invalidated state law requiring premium overtime pay for women but not men); Ro-
[Vol 16.361
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Although fifteen years have passed since the enactment of Title
VII, federal courts have found it difficult to articulate the employ-
ment conditions that properly call for sex as a BFOQ and the stan-
dard of proof necessary to reach that conclusion. The two-step
analysis required by Title VII has produced a myriad of standards
which courts may apply in determining the appropriateness of the
defense. In Diaz v. Pan-American World Airways, Inc.,2 the Fifth
Circuit specified employment circumstances under which the BFOQ
should apply: "[D]iscrimination based on sex is valid only when the
essence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring
members of one sex exclusively."'" Thus, the BFOQ calls for a busi-
ness necessity test rather than a business convenience test.22 Under
the Diaz test, an employee could invoke the BFOQ when hiring
members of one sex would infringe on the privacy rights of the
other.23 In contrast, the BFOQ test developed by the Ninth Circuit
senfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1971) (invalidated state
law regulating weight women could lift on the job); Le Blanc v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602, 609 (E.D.La. 1971) (invalidated state law regulating
number of hours women could work), a ffdper curiam 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972).
See generally, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VI1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1186-95 (1971).
20. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). Plaintiff Diaz ap-
plied for a job as a flight cabin attendant. Defendant rejected him because of its
policy of restricting these positions to females. Id at 386.
The trial court accepted defendant's BFOQ defense. The court found that Pan Am
based its hiring policy on its considerable experience that females performed better as
cabin attendants than males. Females could reassure anxious passengers and give
more courteous service. Furthermore, the policy of excluding males was the best
method of eliminating applicants likely to become unsatisfactory employees. 311 F.
Supp. 559, 563, 568 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (memorandum).
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the BFOQ did not apply unless the essence
of the business would be undermined by not hiring both sexes. The essence of Pan
Am's business was to provide safe transportation, not to provide a pleasant flight
environment. 442 F.2d at 388.
The Fifth Circuit carefully noted that Pan Am could take into account the abilities
of individuals to perform the non-mechanical functions of cabin attendant. However,
defendant could not exclude all males simply because most males might not perform
adequately. Id
21. 442 F.2d at 388.
22. Id Since the ability to soothe passengers and give courteous service was not
necessary to the essence of Pan Am's business, the Fifth Circuit did not have to con-
sider evidence that males generally did not possess these abilities.
23. See Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978).
The court found that being female was a BFOQ for the position of nurse's aide at a
home for the elderly. The position required providing intimate personal care for the
residents. Some women in the home strongly objected to receiving such care from a
19791
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would eliminate even this possibility. In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacfic
Co.,24 the court declared that "sexual characteristics, rather than
characteristics that might, to one degree or another, correlate with a
particular sex, must be the basis of the BFOQ exception."25 In prac-
tice, this narrower formulation would restrict the BFOQ to positions
such as actor/actress, escort or model.
Turning to the second phase of the Title VII analysis, the Fifth
Circuit confronted the burden of proof issue in Weeks v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.26 Weeks specified that the defendant
must show a factual basis for believing "all or substantially all wo-
men would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of
the job involved."27 The court qualified this test in a footnote: "It
may be that where an employer sustains its burden in demonstrating
man. The court noted that due to tort and criminal cases recognizing personal pri-
vacy interests, the home could not force guests to accept such care. Hiring of males
would therefore directly undermine the essence of the home's business-to provide
care for the patients. Due to the small size of the staff, selective job assignment was
impossible. Id at 1351-53.
See also Developments in the Law" Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1185-86. (1971).
24. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th cir. 1971). Plaintiff alleged that defendant discriminated
against her on the basis of sex, by assigning the position of agent-telegrapher to a
junior male employee. Id at 1220. The position required heavy physical effort-
climbing over and around boxcars to adjust their vents, collapse their bunkers and
close and seal their doors. It also required long hours during harvest season, and
lifting the objects heavier than twenty-five pounds. The defendant asserted the
BFOQ applied because of the strenuous nature of the job and state laws which limited
the hours women could work and the weight they could lift. Id at 1223. The court
ultimately rejected the defendant's contention that the job was too strenuous for a
woman and also struck down the state laws. Id at 1225-26.
One author has questioned the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the BFOQ. Old-
ham, Questions of Exclusion and Exception Under Title VII - "Sex-Plus" and the
BFOQ, 23 HAST. L.J. 55, 81 (1971).
25. 444 F.2d at 1225.
26. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
27. Id. at 235. Plaintiff was a female employee who had worked for Bell for
nineteen years. She applied for the job of switchman. The company responded that it
did not assign women to that position. Id at 230. The trial court found sex was a
BFOQ for switchman because the job required lifting weights in excess of thirty
pounds, other strenuous activity, and irregular hours. 277 F. Supp. 117, 118-19 (S.D.
Ga. 1967). The Fifth Circuit reversed because defendant had not met its burden of
showing that it "had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing,
that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved." 408 F.2d at 235.
One flaw of the Weeks test is that it fails to extend Title VII protection to those
women who could do the job. It excuses the employer from showing that the individ-
[Vol 16 361
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that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with women on an
individual basis, it may apply a reasonable general rule."28 This "all
or substantially all" test of Weeks has been used frequently in later
cases.
29
The Supreme Court dealt briefly with defendants' burden of proof
in Phillifps v. Martin Marietta Corp."0 In a case that questioned
whether an employer who otherwise did not discriminate against wo-
men could refuse to hire women, but not men, with pre-school-age
children,3' the Court recognized that circumstances could exist which
are "demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a woman
ual testing is not possible. Developments in the La; Employment Discrimination and
Title VI1 of the Civil RightsAct of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1179-80 (1971).
A second difficulty with the Weeks test is that it does not take into account that the
capabilities of "substantially all women" may differ from those of the women who
want the job in question. The job application process always entails a certain amount
of self-selection.
28. 408 F.2d at 235 n.5. The Fifth Circuit elaborated on this test in Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours. Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). "One method by which the
employer can carry this burden is to establish that some members of the discrimi-
nated-against class possess a trait precluding safe and efficient job performance that
cannot be ascertained by means other than knowledge of the applicant's membership
in the class." Id at 235.
Tanan Trail Tours was an age discrimination case. Federal law generally pro-
hibits discrimination based on age against persons between forty and seventy years
old. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §§ 2 & 4, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623 &
631 (1976), as amended by Act of Apr. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256 § 2, 3. The Act
provides a BFOQ exception. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976).
In Tamiami Trail Tours, the Fifth Circuit upheld defendant's maximum hiring age
for a bus driver of forty. The court stated that the essence of defendant's business was
safe transportation of bus passengers. 531 F.2d at 236. The court found that defend-
ant sustained its Weeks "footnote five" burden by expert medical testimony that med-
ical science could not accurately separate chronlogical from functional age. Certain
physiological changes accompanying age decrease a person's driving ability, and
medical examinations could not detect all these changes. It was thus impossible to
determine which person over forty had the stamina to begin bus driving. Id at 237-
38.
29. Eg. Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 39 (5th Cir. 1974); Diaz v. Pan-American
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971);
Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 238, 244 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Utility
Workers Local 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1266 (C.D. Cal.
1970) (memorandum).
30. 400 U.S. at 542 (1971) (per curiam).
31. Id at 543. The employer showed by statistical evidence that it had no general
policy of discrimination against women. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendant and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court held that
-Jt]he Court of Appeals . . . .erred in reading [§ 703(a) of the Civil Rights] Act as
permitting one hiring policy for men and another for women, both with pre-school-
19791
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than for a man."32 The "demonstrably more relevant" standard then
suggests that the BFOQ could apply any time an employee could
show that men or women generally perform the job better.
Rawlinson apparently adopts the substance of the business neces-
sity test of Diaz and the "all or substantially all" test of Weeks. Em-
phasizing that "[tihe essence of a correctional counselor's job is to
maintain prison security"33 and the finding that the penitentiary con-
ditions violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unu-
sual punishment,3 the Court concluded that women would be unable
age children." Id at 544. The Court remanded the case for consideration of whether
the BFOQ applied.
Justice Marshall, in his concerrence, noted the danger of the Court's reason-
ing-that sex stereotypes would be used to establish a BFOQ. He stated that even if
defendant could show that the vast majority of women with pre-school-age children
have family responsibilities that interfere with job performance, and that men gener-
ally do not have such responsibilities, the BFOQ should not apply. Id at 544-45.
See also Comment, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.: A Muted Victory, 22 CATH.
L. REV. 441 (1972).
32. 400 U.S. 542, 544.
33. 433 U.S. at 335.
34. Id at 334. The Court was referring to Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D.
Ala. 1976) (memorandum). Excerpts from the district court's finding of cruel and
unusual punishment follow.
[L]ack of sanitation throughout the institutions-in living areas, infirmaries,
and food service-presents an imminent danger to the health of each and every
inmate. Prisoners suffer from further physical deterioration because there are no
opportunities for exercise and recreation. Treatment for prisoners with physical
or emotional problems is totally inadequate ....
Prison officials are under a duty to provide inmates reasonable protection from
constant threat of violence ....
The defendants in these cases have failed to carry out that duty. The evidence
establishes that inmates are housed in virtually unguarded, overcrowded dormi-
tories, with no realistic attempt by officials to separate violent, aggressive inmates
from those who are passive or weak.
Id at 329.
These general findings, although grim, did not begin to tell the entire story. The
specific finding concerning sanitation illustrates how deplorable prison conditions
were:
In general, Alabama's penal institutions are filthy. There was repeated testi-
mony at trial that they are overrun with roaches, flies, mosquitos, and other ver-
min . . . . Plumbing facilities are in an exceptional state of disrepair. In one
area housing well over 200 men, there is one functioning toilet. Many toilets will
not flush and are overflowing. Some showers can not be turned off. . . . Wit-
nesses repeatedly commented on the overpowering odor emanating from these
facilities.
Id at 323.
The district court gave an extensive order calling for improvements in the peniten-
[Vol 16 361
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to maintain order." The dormitory-type structure of the prison
buildings, understaffing, constant violence, and lack of any segrega-
tion of sexual offenders from other prisoners would render female
guards especially vulnerable to attack. Such an attack would
threaten not only the woman herself but the basic control of the peni-
tentiary.3 6 "A woman's relative ability to maintain order in a male,
maximum-security, unclassified penitentiary of the type that Ala-
bama now runs could be directly reduced by her womanhood."'"
One question posed by the Rawlinson decision is whether it should
apply at all outside the prison context. The Court followed the rea-
soning of the opinion testimony of the Alabama prison officials,38
tiaries. Id at 331-35. The Supreme Court did not consider whether women should be
allowed to serve as guards once order is established.
One explanation of the Rawlinson results is that the Supreme Court considered the
Eighth Amendment violations already so serious that if there was any danger that
female guards would cause further chaos, it would not be conscionable to order that
they be hired. A more likely explanation is that the Court thought, on the whole, that
prisons were no place for a woman. The Court, however, recognized that "[i]n the
usual case, the argument that a particular job is too dangerous for a woman may be
appropriately met by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the
individual woman to make the choice for herself'. 433 U.S. at 335.
35. 433 U.S. at 334-37.
36. Id. at 335-36. Justice Marshall pointed out the fallacy of this reasoning in his
dissent. A guard could not rely solely on his own physical strength to deter attacks.
Instead, he had to depend upon the authority of his position, the threat of swift pun-
ishment for miscreants, and psychological weapons. Id at 343.
Justice Marshall further suggested that the Court's concern about sexual attacks on
female guards was misplaced. Common sense an "innate recognition" did not dictate
that prisoners would rape a female guard. "The only matter of innate recognition is
that the incidence of sexually motivated attacks on guards will be minute compared to
the 'likelihood that inmates will assault' a guard because he or she is a guard." Id at
345-46.
For evidence suggesting the success of the use of female guards in male prisons, see
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISON, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT No. 3713.7 44-
45 (Jan. 7, 1976), quoted in Brief for Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union
at 19, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Brief for Amicus Curiae, State of
California at 3, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Ward, Impact of Female
Emplorees in Adult All-Male Correctional Institutions, 5 CRIME & DELINQUENCY LIT.
90 (1973).
37. 433 U.S. at 335. It is thus unclear whether the Supreme Court found that all
women could not perform as guards, or just "substantially all."
38. Compare the Court's reasoning, 433 U.S. at 335-36, with Brief of Appellants at
6-7 (summary of testimony of Alabama Corrections Commissioner Locke).
The Court also referred to the testimony of plaintif's expert witness that it would
be unwise to use women as guards in a prison where even ten percent of the inmates
had been convicted of sex crimes and were not segregated from other prisoners (in the
Alabama penitentiaries, the percentage of sex offenders was twenty). 433 U.S. at 336.
1979)
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even though the testimony reflected a patronizing attitude towards
women.39 The Court's acceptance of this testimony may be due to
the traditional "hands off' attitude of federal courts toward state pris-
ons, even though the Court stated in a footnote that Congress in-
tended Title VII to apply equally to private and public employers.4 "
Additionally, the reasoning in Rawlinson strongly resembles that of
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union,a" decided only four days
earlier. In that case, the Court stated that a federal court should gve
appropriate deference to the decisions of prison administrators.42 Be-
cause the prison officials' belief that a prisoners' union would be dis-
ruptive was not unreasonable, the administrators did not need
objective evidence to support their position.43 The Doihard Court
The court probably would have reached the same result even in the absence of this
admission by plaintiff's expert. The Court's reasoning before noting this admission
reflects that of the defendant, and that of defendant's experts. Compare 433 U.S. at
334-36 wsith Brief of Appellants at 6, 7, 50, & 51.
39. 433 U.S. at 343-44 & n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring & dissenting). In the foot-
note, Justice Marshall quoted testimony of Corrections Commissioner Locke. Locke
responded to the question of why he thought a woman could not handle the job of
prison guard as follows:
The innate intention between a male and a female. The physical capabilities,
the emotions that go into the make-up of a female vs. that of a male. The atti-
tude of the rural type inmate we have vs. that of a woman. The superior feeling
that a man has, historically, over that of a female.
40. 433 U.S. at 331, n. 14. Title VII originally only applied to private employers.
Congress extended it to state and federal employers in the Equal Opportunity Act of
1972, P.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
41. 433 U.S. 119 (1977). The Court decided North Carolina Prisoner's Union on
June 23, 1977, and Rawlinson on June 27.
42. 433 U.S. at 125. Accord, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976) ("The
federal courts do not sit to supervise state prisons, the administration of which is of
acute interest to the states"); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) ("Such con-
siderations [visitation rules] are peculiarly within the province and professional exper-
tise of corrections officials, and . . . courts should ordinarily defer to their expert
judgment in such matters.") But ef Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 415 (1974)
(Court struck down certain mail censorship rules, because they allowed too much
discretion to correctional employees); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1972)
(Court reversed dismissal of Buddhist prisoner's claim that he denied privileges ac-
corded to Christian and Jewish prisoners); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969)
(where a penitentiary provides no guaranteed means of assistance for writing applica-
tions for writs of habeas corpus, it may not forbid a 'jail house attorney" from doing
so). See also Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded
Role for Courts in Prison Reform 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367 (1977).
43. 433 U.S. at 132-33. The Union's stated purpose was "to seek through collec-
tive bargaining to improve working conditions," and to work to change certain of the
Department of Correction's policies of which it did not approve. Id at 122. The
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did not cite North Carolina Prisoner's Union, however, and in fact
failed to recognize the tension between its "hands off' policy toward
state prisons and the Title VII claim.
Since the Supreme Court did not acknowledge the conflict posed
by dealing with a Title VII state prison defendant 44 and referred to
BFOQ cases not involving prisons, Rawlinson should apply in all fu-
ture BFOQ cases. The Court did not explicitly adopt any BFOQ test.
However, it implicitly adopted the "essence of the business" test of
Diaz and the "all or substantially all" test of Weeks. The BFOQ
applied because the essence of a guard's job was to keep order, and
the likelihood that women could not do this. The Court thus rejected
the Rosenfeld test of "sexual characteristics rather than characterista-
ics that might, to one degree or another, correlate with a particular
sex."
45
Even though the Court apparently thought that substantially all
women could not perform as guards, the Weeks test was not crucial
to the Rawlinson holding.46 Certainly the same result could have
been reached by use of the Phillps dicta-that the BFOQ applies if
Department of Corrections issued regulations which forbade inmates from soliciting
other inmates to join the Union, barred all Union meetings, and forbade delivery of
Union publications to prisoners. Id at 121. The Union claimed that its rights, and
the rights of its members, to engage in free speech and association was infringed.
Further, it asserted an Equal Protection claim, because the authorities allowed the
Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous to have meetings in the prisons. Id. at 122-23.
The district court enjoined enforcement of these regulations because the Defendant
presented no factual evidence that the Union activities would cause disorder. 409 F.
Supp. 937, 944-45 (E.D. N.C. 1976). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was
not necessary for the defendant to present any objective proof; its actions must stand
if based on beliefs that were not unreasonable. 433 U.S. at 128.
44. 433 U.S. at 333 & n.17. See note 20 and accompanying test supra. The Rawl-
inson formulation differs somewhat from Diaz in that Diaz spoke of the "essence of
the business," 442 F.2d at 388, rather than the essence of the job. However, a prison is
not a "business" in the usual sense of the word. The Supreme Court would have
reached the same result had it considered something along the line of the essence of
the functions of a penitentiary.
The reason that the statutory language of the BFOQ mentions "business or enter-
prise" rather than government is that Congress enacted in the BFOQ provision with
the original Civil Rights Act of 1964. Congress extended coverage of this Act to state
and federal governments in 1972. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
45. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971). The
Court also implicitly rejected the EEOC regulations, which allow the BFOQ only
"[wlhere it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness. . . e.g., actor
or actress". 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1977).
46. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
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one sex or the other generally performs the job better.47 The Court
may have rejected this dicta, however, by stating that "the BFOQ was
in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception."4"
The burden of proof test left untouched by the Court was the
Weeks footnote test, that of the impossibility of dealing with women
on an individual basis.49 Again, if the Court had used this test, it
would probably have reached the same result. Serious understaffing
in all of the male penitentiaries meant that male guards could not be
summoned to the aid of a female guard in case of an attack.50 Since
Alabama apparently had never used female guards in the male peni-
tentiaries, it is unlikely that the defendant could have devised some
sort of test or training program to weed out women who would not be
able to maintain order.51 However, the Court did not consider the
possibility that as members of a self-selected group, some females
who wanted to be guards could maintain security.
Despite the Rawlinson Court's failure to clearly articulate a stan-
dard capable of use by other courts, it implicitly established a method
of analysis for future BFOQ cases.52 First, courts should determine
the qualifications essential to the job. In this phase of the analysis,
47. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
48. 433 U.S. at 334.
49. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 n.5. See note 29
and accompanying text supra.
50. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (memorandum).
The Supreme Court also mentioned understaffing of the prisons in Rawlinson. 433
U.S. at 335.
51. Neither plaintiffs nor defendant's briefs argued for the success or failure of
previous employment of female guards in the Alabama maximum security prisons.
The most likely explanation is that no females had been so employed.
52. Two BFOQ cases since Rawlinson are Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware,
Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978) and Manley v. Mobile County, 441 F. Supp.
1351 (S.D. Ala. 1977). In Fesel, the question was whether being female was a FBOQ
for the positions of nurse's aide in a home for the elderly. See note 23 and accompa-
nying text supra. The court first applied the Diaz business necessity test, and found
that it was necessary for the home to provide female nurse's aides for some of the
female patients. It then considered the Weeks "footnote five" test, and concluded the
home could not deal with male nurse's aides on an individual basis. Selective work
assignments would not be feasible, because of staff size limitations.
In Manley, the position in question was identifiable officer at the county jail. De-
fendant claimed that due to extraordinary circumstances (state prisoners were being
put in county jails due to a court order mandating reduction of population in state
prisons), a male was required for the job. The court held that the BFOQ did not
apply. The identification officer did not have any supervisory duties. The position
thus did not have as its "essence" maintaining order. Further, a male staff member
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the employer must show that a characteristic is necessary rather than
tangentially related to the position in question. Assuming the de-
fendant demonstrates this necessity, he has two methods of proving
the correlation between sex and the desired qualities. He can show
that all or substantially all women (or men) do not possess the quali-
fication. Alternatively, he can prove that it is impossible to determine
which women (or men) possess the necessary qualification.
Virginia H. Gaddy
could accompany the plaintiff when she fingerprinted and photographed a new pris-
oner. Id at 1358-59.
19791
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol16/iss1/10
